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Territorial Wars
I. Introduction
In County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation
of New York State (Oneida II), the United States Supreme
Court addressed whether the Oneida Indian Nation may bring
suit for damages based on the occupation and use of aborigi-
nal land conveyed unlawfully to New York State in 1795.1 The
Court held that the Oneidas have a federal common law right
of action for violation of possessory rights2 and that right of
action is not pre-empted by the Indian Trade and
Nonintercourse Act of 1793 (Nonintercourse Act). The Court
also held that the suit is not barred by statutes of limitations,
abatement, ratification or nonjusticiability.'
1. 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985) (Oneida II). The complaint was filed by the Oneidas in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, in 1970.
That court dismissed the claim for lack of federal question jurisdiction, in an unpub-
lished opinion in 1971. The court of appeals affirmed. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding that the claim was not state law based and was not so frivo-
lous as to preclude federal jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues. Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Oneida I). On remand, the district
court trifurcated trial of the issues. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of
Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). Phase one dealt with the liability of the
counties. Phase two dealt with damages. Phase three dealt with indemnification by
the State of New York, a third-party defendant brought into the case by the counties.
This note addresses only the issue of liability, focusing on the actions of Congress
regarding tribal land conveyances and aboriginal land claims. All parties concede the
conveyance was illegal.
2. Oneida II, 105 S. Ct. at 1251-52. See also Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 661. Oneida I
held that this controversy arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States and therefore invokes federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 - 1362.
3. An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, first promul-
gated in 1790, ch. XXXIII, 1 Stat. 137, now codified in 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1983), regu-
lates tribal land conveyances.
4. Oneida II, 105 S. Ct. at 1255-60.
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Part II of this Note presents the primary principles of law
applied to the case, including the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Nonintercourse Act, statutes of limitations, laches,
abatement, ratification and nonjusticiability. Part III exam-
ines the facts of Oneida II and the procedural history of the
case. Part IV sets forth both the majority and the dissenting
opinions. Part V presents an analysis of the majority opinion
juxtaposed against the views of the dissent. Finally, Part VI
concludes that although the analysis of the United States Su-
preme Court is imperfect, its attempt to trace one hundred
seventy-five years of Congressional intent was the correct ana-
lytical approach.
II. Background Law and Historical Development
A. The Nonintercourse Act
The Nonintercourse Act was first promulgated in July
1790, to regulate trade with all Indian nations.5 After five re-
enactments,6 the Act today serves the two-prong purpose of
protecting tribal lands while preserving congressional author-
ity to control those lands.7 Although the present version con-
tains little deviation from the first, regarding tribal land con-
veyances, it is the congressional intent of the 1793 enactment
which must be the focus here.8 The 1793 Act provided that no
tribal land conveyance would be valid unless made by treaty
entered into with an agent of the United States who possessed
the authority to enter into such an agreement.9 The Act pro-
vided for criminal penalties, 10 but no civil remedies were
5. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. XXXIII, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
6. Act of March 1, 1793, ch. XIX, 1 Stat. 329 (repealed 1796); Act of May 19,
1796, ch. XXX, 1 Stat. 469 (expired 1799); Act of March 3, 1799, ch. XLVI, 1 Stat.
743 (1799) (expired 1802); Act of March 30, 1802, ch. XIII, 2 Stat. 139 (1802) (re-
pealed 1834); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. CLXI, 4 Stat. 729.
7. See United States v. University of New Mexico, 731 F.2d 703, 706 (10th Cir.
1984); 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
8. "[OJur focus must be on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in
question." Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831, 839 (1984). See also
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1979).
9. See infra Appendix § 8.
10. See infra Appendix.
[Vol. 4
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authorized.
B. Statutes of Limitations
1. General Principles
Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose, enacted by
legislatures, prescribing periods within which actions may be
brought." The life of a cause of action is limited to promote
substantial justice and provide stability to potential defend-
ants by protecting them from having to answer to stale
claims. 2 If a particular federal cause of action has no applica-
ble federal statute of limitations, the court may judicially cre-
ate a limitation, 3 borrow a statute from another federal
claim,"' borrow a state statute of limitations for an analogous
claim, 5 find there is no limitation period,'" or apply the equi-
table doctrine of laches.'"
If the particular federal cause of action is without a stat-
ute of limitations, federal courts usually prefer to borrow a
state statute of limitations." Two constraints, however, re-
strict such borrowing. First, federal courts may only borrow a
state statute when Congress has not spoken on the subject. 19
Second, borrowing may only occur if it does not frustrate na-
tional policy.20 The Oneida II Court did not borrow an analo-
gous New York statute of limitations because, it stated, to do
so would frustrate national policy.2' It found that there is no
11. Black's Law Dictionary 477 (5th ed. 1983).
12. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). Substantial
justice is promoted by preventing a potential plaintiff from waiting so long that valu-
able evidence or potential witnesses are lost. This is not an issue in Oneida H because
the case presents only issues of law, not of fact.
13. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 198 F.
Supp. 911, 915 (S.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Johnson v. Railway Express, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
19. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
20. Id. See also Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465.
21. County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 105 S.
Ct. 1245, 1255 (1985) (Oneida II).
1986]
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applicable statute of limitations.22
2. Indian Claims and the United States Code
The United States is in a trust relationship with the Indi-
ans.23 In its role as trustee, the federal government may bring
actions on the Indians' behalf.2 4 Section 2415 of Title 28 of
the U. S. Code provides statutes of limitations for such ac-
tions brought under contract and tort law.26 Section 2415(c)
22. Id. at 1255-56.
23. See FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960); United States
v. University of New Mexico, 731 F.2d 703, 706 (10th Cir. 1984). G. Hall, The Fed-
eral-Indian Trust Relationship (1979). See also infra notes 140-42 and accompanying
text.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982). It is also well established that Indians may bring
these claims on their own behalf, as if the United States were bringing the claims for
them under the Nonintercourse Act. Narragansett Tribe v. S.R.I. Land Dev. Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 798, 805-06 (D.R.I. 1976). See generally Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co.,
390 U.S. 365 (1968).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 provides:
(a) . . . every action for money damages brought by the United States
or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or
implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions
have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by
contract or by law, whichever is later: . . . Provided further, That an action
for money damages brought by the United States for or on behalf of a recog-
nized tribe, band or group of American Indians shall not be barred unless the
complaint is filed more than six years and ninety days after the right of ac-
tion accrued: Provided further, That an action for money damages which ac-
crued on the date of enactment of this Act ... brought by the United States
for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band, or group of American Indians, or
on behalf of an individual Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted
status, shall not be barred unless the complaint is filed sixty days after the
date of publication of the list required by section 4(c) of the Indian Claims
Act of 1982: Provided, That, for those claims that are on either of the two
lists published pursuant to the Indian Claims Act of 1982, any right of action
shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within (1) one year after the
Secretary of the Interior has published in the Federal Register a notice re-
jecting such claim or (2) three years after the date the Secretary of the Inte-
rior has submitted legislation or legislative report to Congress to resolve such
claim or more than two years after a final decision has been rendered in ap-
plicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever
is later.
(b) ... every action for money damages brought by the United States or
an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a tort shall be barred
unless the complaint is filed within three years after the right of action first
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/7
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provides, however, that no statute of limitations shall apply to
land claims. 26
C. Laches
The equitable doctrine of laches, like statutes of limita-
tions, is a doctrine of repose. Laches acts as a bar in equity
where the plaintiff has unreasonably neglected to bring a
claim which should have been brought.27 In essence, the doc-
trine punishes inexcusable delays by a plaintiff and protects a
defendant from prejudice occasioned by such delay. 8 Courts
are reluctant, however, to apply laches in actions at law.2
Nevertheless, it is settled that laches could supply a temporal
limitation when the borrowing of a statute of limitations
would frustrate federal policy. 0
accrues: Provided, That an action to recover damages resulting from a tres-
pass on lands of the United States; an action to recover damages resulting
from fire to such lands; an action to recover for diversion of money paid
under a grant program; and an action for conversion of property of the
United States may be brought within six years after the right of action ac-
crues, except that such actions for or on behalf of a recognized tribe, band or
group of American Indians, including actions relating to allotted trust or re-
stricted Indian lands, may be brought within six years and ninety days after
the right of action accrues, except that such actions for or on behalf of a
recognized tribe, band, or group of American Indians, including actions relat-
ing to allotted trust or restricted Indian lands, or on behalf of an individual
Indian whose land is held in trust or restricted status which accrued on the
date of enactment of this Act of the list required by section 4(c) of the Indian
Claims Act of 1982: Provided, That, for those claims that are on either of the
two lists published pursuant to the Indian Claims Act of 1982, any right of
action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within (1) one year after
the Secretary of the Interior has published in the Federal Register a notice
rejecting such claim or (2) three years after the Secretary of the Interior has
submitted legislation or legislative report to Congress to resolve such claim.
28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982), amended by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415 (1985).
26. "Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an action to
establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal property." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415(c) (1982).
27. Black's Law Dictionary 453 (5th ed. 1983).
28. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). Cf. Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423-25 (1975).
29. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965).
30. Cf. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (EEOC enforce-
ment actions, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, are not subject to state
5
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A question remains whether laches can be applied in
cases where an Indian nation brings an action on its own be-
half, rather than the United States bringing the action as
trustee."1
D. Abatement
Abatement is a common law canon of construction used
by the judiciary to determine congressional intent regarding
causes of action which arise from repealed statutes.3 2 The doc-
trine holds that upon expiration of a statute all actions
brought under the statute abate.
3
Congress reversed the common law abatement doctrine as
to criminal actions in 1871. Repeal no longer extinguishes
criminal causes of action unless the repealing act expressly
provides for abatement.3 ' Congress has not, however, modified
the abatement doctrine with regard to civil suits.
E. Ratification
The United States may, through legislation, expressly rat-
ify illegal conveyances which contravene the Nonintercourse
Act. 5 Ratification also may be deemed to exist through impli-
cation.3 6 If Congress is not explicit in its ratification, discern-
statutes of limitations; federal courts do not lack the power to provide relief and
reach a just result specific to the facts of the case); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392 (1946).
31. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
32. Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 322 (1964) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. LXXI, § 4, 16 Stat. 431, 432 (1981):
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the repeal of any statute shall not
have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability
incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly pro-
vide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the pur-
pose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of
such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
35. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982) (Approval of prior transfers and extinguish-
ment of claims and aboriginal title outside town of Charlestown, Rhode Island and
involving other Indians of Rhode Island); 25 U.S.C. § 1723 (1982) (Approval of prior
transfers and extinguishment of Indian title and claims of Indians within State of
Maine).
36. Cf. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). See also Shoshone
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/7
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ible congressional intent is controlling. 37 Congressional intent
is determined by examining the applicable statute's operative
language, legislative history, related circumstances and the
historical exercise of state or tribal jurisdiction over a particu-
lar territory.38
F. Nonjusticiability: The Separation of Powers Doctrine
The political question doctrine arises from the separation
of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government.3 The doctrine holds that a particu-
lar question is beyond judicial competence when authority
over the subject matter is delegated to another branch of gov-
ernment by the Constitution."
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution commits responsi-
bility for regulation of Indian trade and intercourse to Con-
gress." Congress has delegated some of its authority to the
President by both statute 2 and treaty.'3
Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 495 (1937).
37. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. Ry. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1941).
38. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1977); DeCoteau v.
District County Ct. for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975).
39. See generally U.S. Const., arts. I, II & III.
40. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Modern courts apply the follow-
ing test to determine justiciability:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
41. U.S. Const., art. I § 8 provides "The Congress shall have Power States, and
with the Indian Tribes; ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers."
42. See infra Appendix, §§ 1, 2, 5, 6, & 9.
43. Treaty with the Six Nations, 1794, art. VII, 7 Stat. 44 (also referred to as the
Treaty at Canandaigua):
[T]he United States and Six Nations agree, that for injuries done by individ-
uals on either side, no private revenge or retaliation shall take place; but,
7
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These legal doctrines-statutes of limitations, abatement,
ratification and nonjusticiability-constitute the weapons
with which the Indians and the White Man wage a modern-
day battle over aboriginal lands.
III. Factual Setting and Procedural History
A. Factual Setting
The Oneida Indian Nation inhabited land, in what is now
central New York State, from time immemorial until shortly
after the Revolutionary War." Their aboriginal land extended
from Pennsylvania to the Saint Lawrence River and from
Lake Ontario to the western foothills of the Adirondack
Mountains."
Traditionally, the Oneidas were allies of the British.4 6 At
the outset of the Revolutionary War, however, they became
allied with the Colonists.'7 After the war, the United States
sought to reaffirm its alliance by promising, in the Treaty at
Fort Stanwix, that the Oneidas would be secure in the posses-
sion of their lands. 48 Nevertheless, acquiescing to pressure to
instead thereof, complaint shall be made by the party injured, to the other:
By the Six Nations or any of them, to the President of the United States, or
the Superintendant by him appointed: . . . and such prudent measures shall
then be pursued as shall be necessary to preserve our peace and friendship
unbroken; until the legislature . . . of the United States shall make other
equitable provision for the purpose.
44. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527,
533 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). See also 15 Handbook of North American Indians 481-90 (B.
Trigger ed. 1978) [hereinafter Handbook].
45. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527,
533 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
46. See Handbook, supra note 44, at 482-83.
47. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. at 533. See also Handbook, supra note 44, at 483.
48. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, art. III, 7 Stat. 15 (also referred
to as the Treaty at Fort Stanwix):
A line shall be drawn, beginning at the mouth of a creek about four miles
east of Niagara, called Oyonwayea, or Johnston's Landingplace, upon the
lake named by the Indians Oswego, and by us Ontario; from thence southerly
in a direction always four miles east of the carryingpath, between Lake Erie
and Ontario, to the mouth of Tehoseroron or Buffaloe Creek on Lake Erie;
thence south to the north boundary of the state of Pennsylvania; thence west
to the end of the said north boundary; thence south along the west boundary
of the said state, to the river Ohio; the said line from the mouth of the
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/7
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open the Oneida territory for settlement, New York State en-
tered into an agreement with the Oneidas in 1788 to purchase
the majority of their aboriginal land.' 9 The Oneidas retained a
reservation of approximately three hundred thousand acres.5 0
In 1789, the United States once again affirmed its commit-
ment to the Oneidas when it executed the Treaty at Fort
Harmar.5 1
Oyonwayea to the Ohio, shall be the western boundary of the lands of the Six
Nations, so that the Six Nations shall and do yield to the United States, all
claims to the country west of the said boundary, and then they shall be se-
cured in the peaceful possession of the lands they inhabit east and north of
the same, reserving only six miles square round the fort of Oswego, to the
United States, for the support of the same.
49. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. at 533. See also Handbook, supra note 44, at 484.
50. See Handbook, supra note 44, at 484.
51. Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33 (also referred to as the
Treaty at Fort Harmar):
ART. 1.... And whereas the said nations have now agreed to and with
the said Arthur St. Clair, to renew and confirm all the engagements and stip-
ulations entered into at the beforementioned treaty at fort Stanwix: and
whereas it was then and there agreed, between the United States of America
and the said Six Nations, that a boundary line should be fixed between the
lands of the said Six Nations and the territory of the said United States,
which boundary line is as follows, viz: Beginning at the mouth of a creek,
about four miles east of Niagara, called Ononwayea, or Johnston's Landing
Place, upon the lake named by the Indians Oswego, and by us Ontario; from
thence southerly in a direction always four miles east of the carrying place,
between lake Erie and lake Ontario, to the mouth of Tehoseroton, or Buffalo
creek, upon lake Erie; thence south, to the northern boundary of the state of
Pennsylvania; thence west, to the end of the said north boundary; thence
south, along the west boundary of the said state to the river Ohio. The said
line, from the mouth of Ononwayea to the Ohio, shall be the western bound-
ary of the lands of the Six Nations, so that the Six Nations shall and do yield
to the United States, all claim to the country west of the said boundary; and
then they shall be secured in the possession of the lands they inhabit east,
north, and south of the same, reserving only six miles square, round the fort
of Oswego, for the support of the same. The said Six Nations, except the
Mohawks, none of whom have attended at this time, for and in consideration
of the peace then granted to them, the presents they then received, as well as
in consideration of a quantity of goods, to the value of three thousand dol-
lars, now delivered to them by the said Arthur St. Clair, the receipt whereof
they do hereby acknowledge, do hereby renew and confirm the said boundary
line in the words beforementioned, to the end that it may be and remain as a
division line between the lands of the said Six Nations and the territory of
the United States, forever ....
ART. 3. The Oneida and Tuscarora nations, are also again secured and
9
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Congress passed the first Nonintercourse Act in 1790.52
The Act purported to regulate trade with the various Indian
tribes. It was reenacted in 1793. The Act of 1793 provided for
federal regulation of all tribal land conveyances. 3 In 1795, the
Governor of New York authorized a purchase of virtually all
the remaining Oneida territory.5 4 The Oneidas sold their land
in exchange for annual cash payments of $2,952.11 The con-
veyance was transacted without the approval of the federal
government and in the absence of any agent of the United
States, thereby violating the Nonintercourse Act.56
B. Procedural History
The Oneidas instituted this action in 1970 in the United
States District Court, Northern District of New York. 7 They
alleged the 1795 conveyance violated the Nonintercourse Act
of 1793. 58 They argued that the conveyance was therefore void
confirmed in the possession of their respective lands.
ART. 4. The United States of America renew and confirm the peace and
friendship entered into with the Six Nations (except the Mohawks,) at the
treaty beforementioned, held at fort Stanwix, declaring the same to be per-
petual ....
52. Nonintercourse Act, ch. XXX, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
53. Nonintercourse Act, ch. XIX, § 8, 1 Stat. 330, 330 (1793). See infra Appen-
dix, § 8.
54. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. at 533-35.
55. Brief for Petitioner at 103, County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York State, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985)(Oneida II) (citing the Treaty of
1795) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
56. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. at 535. Attorney General William Bradford interpreted
the Nonintercourse Act to expressly forbid New York's purchase of Indian land with-
out the intervention of the federal government. Governor Jay, of New York, was
aware of the interpretation when, on behalf of New York, he purchased one hundred
thousand acres of the Oneida reservation. The purchase constituted a violation of the
Nonintercourse Act because no federal representative participated in the transaction,
as required by § 8 of the 1793 Act. This fact was conceded by all parties and was not
in issue in Oneida I. Id.
57. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525
(2d Cir. 1983). The Oneidas initiated the action in the federal court by asserting di-
versity of citizenship and the required jurisdictional amount. Federal question juris-
diction was asserted by amendment to the complaint. Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 663 n.2 (1974)(Oneida I).
58. Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 664-65.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/7
ONEIDA INDIAN NATION
and their right of possession was never terminated.59 The
Oneidas sought damages representing the alleged fair rental
value of the land for the two-year period from January 1968
to December 1969.60
The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction."e The court ruled the cause of ac-
tion was created under state law,6 2 therefore no federal ques-
tion jurisdiction existed .6  The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the district court's holding in 1972, ruling that
a complaint seeking relief based on possession of real property
did not raise a federal question. 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals in 1973,65 holding that the complaint stated a cause of
action which arose under federal common law. Conse-
quently, jurisdiction was asserted and the case was
remanded.
On remand, the district court found that the conveyance
violated the Nonintercourse Act.6 The counties were held lia-
ble for wrongful possession. 69 The court reasoned that a good
59. Id.
60. Id. at 665.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The district court ruled that the possible necessity of interpreting federal
law or treaties to resolve a defense was not sufficient to sustain federal question
jurisdiction.
64. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d
Cir. 1972). Although the Nonintercourse Act is a law of the United States, the court
of appeals ruled that actions alleging possessory rights do not arise under the Act.
Therefore, the court reasoned, no federal question was raised by the complaint.
65. See generally Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661
(1974)(Oneida I). The Supreme Court ruled that a federal question was raised under
the Nonintercourse Act. Furthermore, this was a meritorious issue which did not arise
solely in anticipation of a defense.
66. Id. at 666-74. The Court found federal common law governs Indian land
rights where there is no such statutory law.
67. Id. at 682.
68. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. at 541. The district court relied upon the
Nonintercourse Act now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177, which states that no purchase of
Indian land, unless made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Con-
stitution, shall be of any validity in law or equity.
69. Id. at 527. The district court ruled that the Oneida land came within the
protection of the Nonintercourse Act and that the Act had been violated by convey-
1986]
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faith purchase would not render valid title where the Act had
been violated. 0 The district court concluded that the action
was timely7 and was not defeated by any statute of limita-
tions or by adverse possession.72
The court of appeals affirmed, 73 sustaining the Oneidas'
right to bring a federal common law action for wrongful pos-
session. 4 The court of appeals held the Nonintercourse Act
did not pre-empt the federal common law action,75 that an im-
plied private right of action existed under the Act, 7  and that
the Oneidas' cause of action was not barred by the passage of
time.7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1984. 71 The task
which lay ahead of the Court was a cumbersome one. Deter-
mination of the case depended upon legislative history and
case law dating back to the 1700's. The Court trudged through
the mire and held, in March 1985, that the Oneidas' claim was
indeed a viable one, nearly two hundred years after the cause
of action accrued.
ance without federal intervention.
70. Id. at 530.
71. Id. at 541-44.
72. Id.
73. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 525
(2d Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 530. Citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which empowers Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indians, the court of appeals held a federal common law
cause of action exists.
75. Id. at 531. The court of appeals found that the Act augmented the federal
common law protecting Indian property rights.
76. Id. at 532. The court found it was the intent of Congress to create a private
right of action under the Nonintercourse Act because the purpose of the Act is to
benefit the Indian tribes.
77. See generally Oneida, 719 F.2d at 525. The court held the Oneidas' claim
was not barred by abatement, ratification or any statute of limitations.
78. The counties petitioned for review of the court of appeals' rulings. The Su-
preme Court, recognizing that the issues raised may apply to future aboriginal land
claims, deemed it necessary to resolve the issues herein. County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 104 S. Ct. 1590 (1984).
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IV. Supreme Court Opinions
A. Majority Opinion
After granting the counties' writ of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' finding of liability under federal common law."0 The
Court reasoned that federal common law is a necessary expe-
dient where Congress has not spoken directly to a particular
issue.8s It found that Congress did not address the availability
of civil remedies in the 1793 Act.' Therefore, the Court held,
that the Nonintercourse Act did not pre-empt the Oneidas'
federal common law right of action.2
On the issue of statutes of limitations, the Court held
that none would bar the Oneidas' claim." The court deter-
mined there was no applicable federal statute of limitations"
and ruled that borrowing New York's statute of limitations
for an analogous claim would be inconsistent with national
policy.85
The counties contended that the Oneidas' cause of action
abated when the Nonintercourse Act expired in 1796.86 The
Court disagreed and concluded that a sovereign act was re-
quired to extinguish aboriginal title. " The abatement ration-
79. County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State,
105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985) (Oneida II).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1253-54. Finding the Act made no mention of available civil remedies,
the Court concluded that Congress merely failed to address the issue. Furthermore,
the Court asserted this was not an oversight, but that Congress affirmatively contem-
plated that civil suits would be brought by the Indians. In support of its assertion,
the Court cites a letter from George Washington (4 American State Papers, Indian
Affairs, vol. 1 at 142 (1832)) to the Chief of the Seneca Nation assuring the Chief that
the federal courts would be open to the Indians to redress any just complaints regard-
ing unauthorized land transfers.
82. Oneida II, 105 S. Ct. at 1252-54.
83. Id. at 1255-57.
84. Id. at 1255.
85. Id. at 1255-57. Although Congress did give limited jurisdiction to New York
in civil matters involving Indians, it explicitly withheld jurisdiction from New York in
matters regarding Indian land claims. See infra note 135.
86. Brief for Petitioner at 35-36.
87. Oneida H, 105 S. Ct. at 1257. The Court held that § 8 of the 1793 Act merely
codified the principle that a sovereign act was necessary to extinguish aboriginal title.
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ale was particularly unconvincing to the Court because each
reenactment contained virtually the same provisions as the
enactment before it.8e
The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the counties'
ratification defense.8 9 Congress did not ratify the 1795 convey-
ance by entering into subsequent treaties with the Oneidas,
the Court held, because Congressional intent to extinguish ab-
original title in land must be plain and unambiguous.9 0 No
language indicating such intent was found in subsequent
treaties.91
On the issue of nonjusticiability, the Court held that Con-
gressional power over Indian affairs is not absolute in all re-
spects.92 Some matters, such as the Oneidas' claim, may be
adjudicated. 3
B. Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Associate Justices White and Rehnquist, Justice Stevens
recognized there was no applicable statute of limitations but
asserted that some doctrine of repose must be applied to the
claim.94 The dissent acknowledged the trust relationship be-
tween the Government and the Indians but suggested that
such a relationship is outdated today. 5 Abolishment of the
trust relationship would allow the Court to apply the doctrine
of laches to Indian land claims.96 The dissent, therefore, urged
the adoption of laches to this case, thereby time-barring the
Oneidas' cause of action.9 7
88. Id. All subsequent versions of the Act contain the same restraint on aliena-
tion of tribal lands. Therefore, the Court reasoned, Congress did not intend a cause of
action grounded in the 1793 Act to abate upon expiration or amendment of the Act.
89. Id. at 1258-59.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1259.
92. Id. at 1259-60.
93. Id. Applying the test for nonjusticiability enunciated in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the Court held the Oneida's claim is justiciable.
94. Oneida H, 105 S. Ct. at 1262-72.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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The dissent also suggested that while modern statutes are
useful in determining current national policy, such an analysis
is irrelevant because the laws of the eighteenth century, and
the Congressional intent behind them, must be applied here. 8
Addressing the modern statute relied on by the majority of
the Court, Justice Stevens noted that the legislative history of
28 U.S.C. § 2415 indicates that the statute applies when In-
dian claims are brought by the United States, as trustee for
the Indians, but is not applicable when claims are brought by
the Indians themselves. 9 This supported his assertion that
laches may be applied to the Oneidas' claim.'00
The dissent asserted further that no civil remedy is avail-
able after so long a period because Constitutional intent is
to honor legitimate expectations in the ownership of real
property."10
V. Analysis
A. The Nonintercourse Act
Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal
law with the signing of the Constitution.102 Consequently, the
first Indian land claims presented to the Court were recog-
nized as coming within federal jurisdiction. 03 Oneida I estab-
lished the Oneidas' claim within the purview of the federal
court.0 4 Oneida II held it was a common law claim which was
not defeated by any act of Congress or by any of the princi-
ples of law raised on appeal. 05 Recognizing that resolution of
the case must begin by turning the clock back to 1795,106 the
98. Id. at 1270-72.
99. Id.
100. Id. But see infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
101. Oneida II, 105 S. Ct. at 1270-72.
102. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 -U.S. 515
(1832).
103. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
104. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Oneida I).
105. County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 105 S.
Ct. 1245 (1985) (Oneida II).
106. See supra note 8.
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Court examined the 1793 enactment of the Nonintercourse
Act. Applying a test first enunciated in Milwaukee v. Ili-
nois,l' 7 the Court found that the 1793 Act did not speak di-
rectly to the question of civil remedies. 10 8 It ascertained that
Congress contemplated the possibility of Indians initiating le-
gal actions to establish their property rights. 0 9 Based upon
that finding, the Court held that the Nonintercourse Act of
1793 did not pre-empt common law tribal land claims.110
A contrary determination may, however, be reached by
delving into the opinions held by those who were alive during
the relevant time period. Chief Justice John Marshall stated,
in 1831:
At the time the constitution was framed, the idea of ap-
pealing to an American court of justice for an assertion of
right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered the
mind of an Indian or of his tribe.... This was well under-
stood by the statesmen who framed the constitution ...
and might furnish some reason for omitting to enumerate
them among the parties who might sue in the courts of
the union.1
Evidence supporting Justice Marshall's position, and opposing
107. "[Tlhe question was whether the legislative scheme 'spoke directly to a
question' . . . not whether Congress had affirmatively proscribed the use of federal
common law." Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978)).
108. Oneida 11, 105 S. Ct. at 1253.
109. Id. at 1254. The Court concluded the 1793 Act did not establish a compre-
hensive remedial plan responding to Indian property rights violations and that no
legislative history exists indicating Congressional intent to pre-empt common law
remedies.
110. Id. The Court looked to the Act of 1822 in reaching its conclusion that the
1793 Act did not preempt common law remedies. However, early history of the
United States indicates a rapid evolution of the Government's relations with the Indi-
ans. This may be one reason why each reenactment of the Nonintercourse Act was of
a temporary nature. It was imprudent for the Oneida II Court to interpret the 1822
Act in reaching its preemption determination.
111. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). The Cherokee Nation sought
an injunction to restrain the State of Georgia from enforcing its laws within the Cher-
okee territory, as designated by treaty. Justice Marshall declined jurisdiction, holding
"an Indian tribe or nation ... cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United
States." Id. at 20,
[Vol. 4
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the position taken in Oneida II, is found in the Judiciary Act
of 1796, which suggests that Indian right of access to the
courts may have been attained only through specific statutory
grant.112
In light of this legal posture, any provision in the 1793
Act denying Indians access to the Court would have been un-
necessary surplusage."' It can be concluded, therefore, that
the Oneidas did not have a common law right of access to the
courts in 1795.
Modern case law also assists in determining Congres-
sional intent. Cort v. Ash,114 a 1975 case, delineated a four-
part test to determine when private rights of action may be
implied from federal statutes. 15 The first question posed is
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose spe-
cial benefit the statute was enacted. Because there is virtually
no legislative history relating to the Nonintercourse Act, rele-
vant history and Presidential communications may be consid-
ered when construing the Act. 1 Congressional records indi-
112. See Crane, Congressional Intent or Good Intentions: The Inference of Pri-
vate Rights of Action Under the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 63 B.U.L. Rev.
853, 853 (1983) (which notes that the Judiciary Act of 1796 restricted Indian access to
the Court).
113. "It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possi-
ble, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute... so that no part will be inopera-
tive or superfluous .... " 2A Sutherland, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 46.06
(C. Dallas Sands ed., 4th ed. 1985).
114. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
115.
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted[?]" . . . Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78.
116. 2A Sutherland, Statutes & Statutory Construction §§ 48.03, 48.05 (C. Dallas
Sands ed., 4th ed. 1985).
§ 48.03. Preenactment history.
It is established practice in American legal processes to consider relevant
information concerning the historical background of enactment in making de-
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
cate concern about the welfare of the Indian nations. The
concern, however, was motivated by a desire to ensure expan-
sion of White settlement. The federal government sought to
achieve its goal through wars, treaties and statutes. Recogniz-
ing that pioneers would move west more readily in a peaceful
atmosphere, the Nonintercourse Act was promulgated as one
means of maintaining peace on the frontier. The rationale was
that federal intervention in negotiations with the Indians
would prevent misunderstandings which could lead to frustra-
tion, anger and Indian violence against white settlers. Clearly,
the Indians may have reaped the benefit of peace through the
Nonintercourse Act, but the Act was promulgated for the spe-
cial benefit of the pioneers of our new nation.117
cisions about how a statute is to be construed and applied.... These extrin-
sic aids may show the circumstances under which the statute was passed, the
mischief at which it was aimed and the object it was supposed to achieve.
§ 48.05 Messages of the executive.
It is customary for the executive to address the legislature at the begin-
ning of each of its sessions concerning conditions in the nation or state that
require its attention. . . . In construing ambiguous statutes, courts have re-
ferred to messages of the executive to the legislature .... Executive messages
may contain relevant historical information even when not addressed to the
legislature....
Id. (citations omitted).
117. Hostilities between many of the Indian nations and settlers were uncontrol-
lable. Prior to promulgation of the Nonintercourse Act, only two avenues of recourse
were available to Congress - war and treaty. War inhibited pioneer settlement and
Indian nations were growing reluctant to enter treaty agreements. See Speech of the
President of the United States to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in State Papers
and Publick Documents of the United States (1789-1796) at 13; Speech of the Presi-
dent of the United States to Both Houses of Congress (Oct. 25, 1791), reprinted in
State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States (1789-1796) at 19; Speech
of the President of the United States to Congress (Nov. 6, 1792), reprinted in State
Papers and Publick Documents of the United States (1789-1796) at 27; Speech of the
President of the United States to Both Houses of Congress (Dec. 8, 1795), reprinted
in Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 4th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 12; W. Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A Study of the Past
and Present Status of the American Indian, 52 (1971) (writing of George Washington
dated 1784). See also F. Prucha, Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays
77 (1981). The Intercourse Act provided a third means of attaining peaceful expan-
sion of White territory. See Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7,
1783), reprinted in F. Prucha, Documents of United States Indian Policy 1 (1975).
See also 4 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol.1 (1789-1797); W. Graves, The
Evolution of American Indian Policy: From Colonial Times to the Florida Treaty
185-86 (1982).
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The second question raised is whether the
Nonintercourse Act served its purpose. The imposition of
criminal penalties, expressly enumerated in the 1793 Act,118
adequately ensured compliance with the law and promoted its
purpose of achieving peace to promote white expansion. There
was, and is, no need to create an implied private right of ac-
tion through judicial legislation.
The third question is whether implying a remedy is con-
sistent with the purpose of the statutory scheme. The purpose
of the Nonintercourse Act was to protect Indians from aliena-
tion of aboriginal land as a means of promoting peaceful white
settlement.119 The Act was enforced through criminal actions
commenced by government authorities. 120 Implying a private
right of action is inconsistent with this scheme. Assuming, ar-
guendo, that a private right of action may be consistent with
Congressional purposes, it is, nonetheless unnecessary because
the express provisions of the Act adequately ensured its
stated goal - to preserve peace. It would be an abuse of judi-
cial power to imply a remedy where Congress has exerted its
authority. 121
The fourth, and final, question posed is whether the cause
of action is traditionally an area of state concern. The Consti-
tution answers this question - Congress is given power over
Indian affairs.'22
Oneida II did not apply the four-part test examined
above. Had it done so, the Court would have found the
Oneidas do not possess an implied right of action under the
Nonintercourse Act of 1793.123
118. See infra Appendix.
119. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
120. See infra Appendix.
121. Congress exercised its Constitutional authority over trade with Indians
when it promulgated the Nonintercourse Act. The separation of powers doctrine pro-
hibits the Judiciary from creating law where Congress has acted. See supra notes 39-
40 and accompanying text.
122. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl.3.
123. Contra Note, Indian Law-Access to the Federal Courts, County of Oneida,
New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985), 21
Land & Water L. Rev. 89 (1986) (which applies the Cort v. Ash test and concludes an
implied remedy is available to the Oneidas in this case).
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The next step in the Court's analysis was to examine
whether any Congressional action occurred since 1795 which
would defeat the Oneida's claim today.
B. Abatement
Oneida II held that subsequent repeal and reenactment
of the Nonintercourse Act did not abate the Oneidas' claim.
The Court, adhering to case law124 and established rules of
statutory construction, 12 5 reasoned that because each reenact-
ment contained the same restraint on alienation of aboriginal
land, that provision (section 8 of the 1793 Act) never ter-
minated.
The question, however, is not whether alienation of land
is prohibited. The question is whether the cause of action is
viable today. Rules of statutory construction direct that " any
provisions ...which are inconsistent with the reenactment
are repealed." '26 The 1796 and 1799 re-enactments each con-
tained a savings clause, preserving any cause of action which
may have arisen under the previous version of the
Nonintercourse Act. 2 " The 1802 re-enactment did not contain
124. Bear Lake & River Water Works & Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1
(1896).
Although there is a formal repeal of the old by the new statute, still there
never has been a moment of time since the passage of the act ... when these
similar provisions have not been in force. Notwithstanding, therefore, this
formal repeal, it is . . . entirely correct to say that the new act should be
construed as a continuation of the old.
Id. at 11-12.
125. "The reenactment of a statute is a continuation of the law as it existed prior
to the reenactment as far as the original provisions are repeated without change in
the reenactment." 1A Sutherland, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 23.29 (N.S.
Singer, ed., 4th ed. 1985).
126. Id. (citation omitted)
127. Nonintercourse Act, ch. XXX, § 21, 1 Stat. 469, 474 (1796).
And be it further enacted, That all and every other act and acts, coming
within the purview of this act, shall be, and they are hereby repealed: Pro-
vided, nevertheless, that all disabilities, that have taken place, shall continue
and remain; all penalties and forfeitures, that have been incurred, may be
recovered; and all prosecutions and suits, that may have been commenced,
may be prosecuted to final judgment, under the said act or acts, in the same
manner, as if the said act or acts were continued, and in full force and virtue.
Nonintercourse Act, ch. XLVI, § 21, 1 Stat. 743, 749 (1799).
[Vol. 4
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a similar provision.""8 Therefore, all causes of action which
arose prior to 1802, including the Oneida's claim, abated in
that year.
C. Ratification
The unlawful conveyance of Oneida land in 1795 was
never expressly ratified by Congress, although the Oneidas
subsequently ceded land to the United States, by treaties
dated 1798 and 1802. The boundaries, as described in those
treaties, are ambiguous.'" 9 In the presence of ambiguity, the
Court must liberally construe treaties in favor of the Indi-
ans.13 0 In light of the confusion raised by the 1798 and 1802
treaties, the Court prudently determined that the 1795 con-
veyance was never ratified by Congress. 3'
And all disabilities which have taken place shall continue and remain; and all
penalties and forfeitures, that have been incurred, may be recovered, and all
prosecutions and suits which may have been commenced, may be prosecuted
to final judgment, under the act, to regulate trade and intercourse with the
Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers.
128. Nonintercourse Act, ch. XIII, 2 Stat. 139 (1802).
129. The 1798 Treaty provided:
[T]he said Indians do cede release and quit claim to the people of the State
of New York forever all the lands within their reservation to the westward
and southwestward of a line from the northeastern corner of lot No. 54 in the
last purchase from them running northerly to a Button wood tree. . . stand-
ing on the bank of the Oneida lake.
County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 105 S.Ct. 1245,
1258 n.19 (1985) (Oneida II) (citing Ratified Indian Treaties 1722-1869, National
Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No.668 (roll 2) (emphasis added)).
The 1802 Treaty provided:
The said Indians do cede ... All that certain tract of land, beginning at the
southwest corner of the land lying along the Genesee road .... and running
thence along the last mentioned tract easterly, to the southest corner thereof;
thence southerly, in the direction of the continuation of the east bounds of
said last mentioned tract, to other lands heretofore ceded by the said Oneida
nation of Indians, to the People of the State of New York. ...
Reprinted in 4 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. 1, at 664 (1832).
130. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977); DeCoteau v. Dis-
trict County Court for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975); Choctaw
Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,
675 (1912). See also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 174
(1973).
131. Brief for Petitioner at 43, argued, if the 1795 conveyance is declared invalid
and unratified, the tract of land ceded in 1798 "would be floating, unattached, in a
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D. Statutes of Limitations
There was no federal statute of limitations applicable to
Indian claims until 1966.33 The limitations then imposed ap-
plied only to contract and tort claims. 133 In 1982, the statute
was amended to specifically reject application of any time lim-
itation to aboriginal land claims."" The Court, therefore, cor-
rectly held there is no federal statute of limitations barring
the Oneidas' claim.
It also held that borrowing a New York statute of limita-
tions for an analogous claim would frustrate current national
policy. 135 Oneida H examined 25 U.S.C. § 233, a congressional
grant of jurisdiction to New York over civil actions involving
Indians. The scope of power granted to New York specifically
excluded Indian land claims which arose prior to passage of
§ 233, in 1952.136 The Court concluded, therefore, that Con-
gress intended that no state statute of limitations be applied
to this case.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, emphasized that the laws
contemporaneous with the unlawful conveyance must be ap-
sea of Oneida territory" and this would create a burdensome "checkerboard
jurisdiction."
132. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. 89-505, 80 Stat. 304.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)-(b) (1966).
134. See supra note 26.
135. Oneida H, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1255-57 (1985).
136.
The courts of the State of New York under the laws of such State shall have
jurisdiction in civil actions and proceedings between Indians or between one
or more Indians and any other person or persons to the same extent as the
courts of the State shall have jurisdiction in other civil actions and proceed-
ings, as now or hereafter defined by the laws of such State. .. nothing herein
contained shall be construed as subjecting the lands within any Indian reser-
vation in the State of New York to taxation for the State or local purposes,
nor as subjecting any such lands, or any Federal or State annuity in favor of
Indians or Indian tribes, to execution on any judgment rendered in the State
courts, except in the enforcement of a judgment in a suit by one tribal mem-
ber against another in the matter of the use or possession of land ... nothing
herein contained shall be construed as conferring jurisdiction on the courts of
the State of New York or making applicable the laws of the State of New
York in civil actions involving Indian lands or claims with respect thereto
which relate to transactions or events transpiring prior to September 13, 1952
[the effective date of this Act].
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plied. 3 ' There were, however, no statutes of limitations in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which would
bar the Oneida's claim today. As noted above, no federal stat-
ute of limitations existed prior to 1966. Moreover, the borrow-
ing of a New York statute would be improper. As Justice Ste-
vens observed, it is inappropriate to borrow a state statute of
limitations where there is a "unique federal interest in the
subject matter."'3 8 The United States had a unique interest in
aboriginal lands. As the conquering nation, the United States
held a right of title in the land, but the Indians, as the con-
quered people, held a right of occupation. 39 These unique cir-
cumstances placed the United States in the role of trustee of
aboriginal lands. 40 The trust relationship has continued since
the birth of our nation."' This continuum signifies the impor-
tance accorded this unique subject matter by the federal
government.
Therefore, although the Court erred in its choice of ana-
lytical method, it reached the correct conclusion - there was
and continues to be no statute of limitations which would bar
the Oneidas' claim.
E. Laches
In the absence of an applicable statute of limitations, the
dissent asserted that some principle of repose must be exer-
cised. Justice Stevens urged the application of laches to the
Oneidas' claim, acknowledging that this equitable doctrine is
not usually applied to claims brought at law." 2 Bridging the
gap between law and equity is, however, only a small obstacle
137. Oneida II, 105 S. Ct. at 1263. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
138. Oneida H, 105 S. Ct. at 1263.
139. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. Ry. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Mohegan
Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
140. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 569 (1823). See also Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832);
141. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960); United States v.
University of New Mexico, 731 F.2d 703, 706 (10th Cir. 1984). See also H.R. Rep. No.
807, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 206, 207;
H.R. Rep. No. 954, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982).
142. Oneida II, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1266 (1985).
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facing a court which would attempt to apply laches to an ab-
original land claim.
Justice Stevens' suggestion embraces several problems
which stem from the trust relationship between the United
States and the Indians. The United States, as trustee, may
bring claims on the Indians' behalf.1 3 As the sovereignty, the
United States is immune from the laches doctrine.'44 The
courts have held that Indians bringing actions on their own
behalf are accorded the same privileges and immunities ex-
tended to the United States, as trustee. 141 Congress has not
spoken directly to the issue, but the legislative history of 28
U.S.C. § 2415 contains congressional dialogue regarding a time
limit in which to commence aboriginal land claims. 46 An ex-
amination of this congressional record reflects a tacit concur-
rence with judicial law.
This issue is beyond the scope of this casenote. It must be
noted, however, that Congress is the only branch of our Gov-
ernment which has the constitutional authority to clarify this
issue. Judicial determination regarding the application of
laches to aboriginal land claims brought by Indians on their
own behalf would be an impermissible act of judicial legisla-
tion under the separation of powers doctrine.
F. Justiciability
The Constitution grants power over Indian affairs to Con-
143. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
144. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. 720, 735 (1824). See also Utah Power
& Light Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 389, 409 (1916).
145. See Oneida Indian Nation v. State of New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1084 (2d
Cir. 1982) (Action brought by the Oneidas to invalidate land purchases made by New
York prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution; held: it would be
"anomolous to allow the trustee to sue under more favorable conditions than those
afforded the tribes themselves."); Schaghticoke Tribe v. Kent School Corp., Inc., 423
F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Conn. 1976) (Action to regain possession of land transferred in
violation of the Nonintercourse Act; held: "delay-based defenses were not available in
actions by Indians to recover lands alienated in violation of the Nonintercourse
Act."); Narragansett v. S.R.I. Land. Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 805-06 (D.R.I.
1976).
146. See generally 123 Cong. Rec. 22164-72 (1977)(House debate); 126 Cong.
Rec. 3287-91 (1980) (Senate debate).
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gress. ' 7 Congress has not delegated that power to the Court.
The function of the Court, in matters of Indian affairs, is to
interpret the laws enacted by Congress. " " The Oneida II
Court adhered strictly to its task. The Court refrained from
judicially creating new Indian law. It painstakingly attempted
to trace nearly two hundred years of congressional intent and
legislation. This case does not represent a breach of constitu-
tional authority.149 The Oneidas' claim, as addressed by the
Court, therefore, presents a justiciable question.
VI. Conclusion
The ramifications of Oneida H are overwhelming. En-
couraged by the progress of this case, Indian nations across
the country have initiated similar claims. Thousands of acres
of settled and developed land are currently in litigation.15 0
This type of protracted litigation promises to have a devastat-
ing effect on property values, local businesses and local econo-
mies. The judicial disposition of these lawsuits may result in
ejectment of current good-faith purchasers, or, perhaps, the
payment of high rental or purchase fees.15 1
This is a vexing scenario, but it is not preordained. Con-
gress has the power to alter the course of Indian land claims.
Oneida H exhibits the Court's strong adherence to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. The Court demonstrated its willing-
ness to follow the path forged by Congress. Congress has the
duty to unambiguously point the proper direction. If Congress
neglects its responsibility the Court may unintentionally blaze
a new trail into the congressional realm of Indian relations.
Nina Dale
147. U.S. Const. art I., § 8, cl. 3.
148. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); See also Oneida, 691 F.2d at
1082.
149. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985), rev'd & remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2039 (1986)
(144,000 acres); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1981) (2,500
acres); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Kirk, 565 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (64,015
acres).
151. See Crane, supra note 112, at 853-55.
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APPENDIX
An Act to regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian
Tribes.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That no person shall be permitted to carry on any
trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes, without a license
under the hand and seal of the superintendent of the depart-
ment, or of such other person, as the President of the United
States shall authorize to grant licenses for that purpose; which
superintendent, or person so authorized shall, on application,
issue such license, for a term not exceeding two years, to any
proper person, who shall enter into bond with one or more
sureties approved of by the superintendent, or person issuing
such license, or by the President of the United States, in the
penal sum of one thousand dollars, payable to the United
States, conditioned for the true and faithful observance of
such rules, regulations and restrictions, as are or shall be
made, for the government of trade and intercourse with the
Indian tribes. The said superintendents, and persons licensed,
as aforesaid, shall be governed, in all things touching the said
trade and intercourse, by such rules and regulations, as the
President of the United States shall prescribe.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the superinten-
dent, or person issuing such license, shall have full power and
authority to recall the same, if the person so licensed shall
transgress any of the regulations or restrictions, provided for
the government of trade and intercourse with the Indian
tribes, and shall put in suit such bonds, as he may have taken,
on the breach of any condition therein contained.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That every person, who
shall attempt to trade with the Indian tribes, or shall be found
in the Indian country, with such merchandise in his posses-
sion, as are usually vended to the Indians, without lawful li-
cense, shall forfeit all the merchandise offered for sale to the
Indians, or found in his possession, in the Indian country, and
shall, moreover, be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars, and to imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, at the
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discretion of the court, in which the trial shall be: Provided,
That any citizen of the United States, merely travelling
through any Indian town or territory, shall be at liberty to
purchase, by exchange or otherwise, such articles as may be
necessary for his subsistence, without incurring any penalty.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen or
inhabitant of the United States, or of either of the territorial
districts of the United States, shall go into any town, settle-
ment, or territory, belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians,
and shall there commit murder, robbery, larceny, trespass or
other crime, against the person or property of any friendly In-
dian or Indians, which, if committed within the jurisdiction of
any state, or within the jurisdiction of either of the said dis-
tricts, against a citizen thereof, would be punishable by the
laws of such state or district, such offender shall be subject to
the same punishment, as if the offence had been committed
within the state or district, to which he or she may belong,
against a citizen thereof.
Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That if any such citizen
or inhabitant shall make a settlement on lands belonging to
any Indian tribe, or shall survey such lands, or designate their
boundaries, by marking trees, or otherwise, for the purpose of
settlement, he shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one thousand
dollars, nor less than one hundred dollars, and suffer impris-
onment not exceeding twelve months, in the discretion of the
court, before whom the trial shall be: And it shall, moreover,
be lawful for the President of the United States, to take such
measures, as he may judge necessary, to remove from lands
belonging to any Indian tribe, any citizens or inhabitants of
the United States, who have made, or shall hereafter make, or
attempt to make a settlement thereon.
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That no person shall be
permitted to purchase any horse of an Indian, or of any white
man in the Indian territory, without special license for that
purpose; which license, the superintendent, or such other per-
son, as the President shall appoint, is hereby authorized to
grant, on the same terms, conditions and restrictions, as other
licenses are to be granted under this act: Provided also, That
every person, who shall purchase a horse or horses, under such
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license, before he exposes such horse or horses for sale, and
within fifteen days after they shall have been brought out of
the Indian country, shall make a particular return, to the su-
perintendent, or other person, from whom he obtained his li-
cense, of every horse by him purchased, as aforesaid, describ-
ing such horses, by their color, height and other natural or
artificial marks, under the penalties contained in their respec-
tive bonds. And every person, purchasing a horse or horses, as
aforesaid, in the Indian country, without a special license,
shall for every horse thus purchased and brought into any set-
tlement of citizens of the United States, forfeit, for every
horse thus purchased, or brought from the Indian country, a
sum not more than one hundred dollars, nor less than thirty
dollars, to be recovered in any court of record having compe-
tent jurisdiction. And every person, who shall purchase a
horse, knowing him to be brought out of the Indian territory,
by any person or persons not licensed, as above, to purchase
the same, shall forfeit the value of such horse: one half for the
benefit of the informant, the other half for the use of the
United States, to be recovered, as aforesaid.
Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That no agent, superin-
tendent, or other person authorized to grant a license to trade,
or purchase horses shall have any interest or concern in any
trade with the Indians, or in the purchase or sale of any hor-
ses, to or from any Indian; and that any person, offending
herein, shall forfeit one thousand dollars, and be imprisoned,
at the discretion of the court, before which the conviction
shall be had, not exceeding twelve months.
Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That no purchase or
grant of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indi-
ans or nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the
United States, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless
the same be made by a treaty or convention entered into pur-
suant to the constitution; and it shall be a misdemeanor, in
any person not employed under the authority of the United
States, in negotiating such treaty or convention, punishable
by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment
not exceeding twelve months, directly or indirectly to treat
with any such Indians, nation or tribe of Indians, for the title
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or purchase of any lands by them held, or claimed: Provided
nevertheless, That it shall be lawful for the agent or agents of
any state, who may be present at any treaty, held with Indi-
ans under the authority of the United States, in the presence,
and with the approbation of the commissioner or commission-
ers of the United States, appointed to hold the same, to pro-
pose to, and adjust with the Indians, the compensation to be
made for their claims to lands within such state, which shall
be extinguished by the treaty.
Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That in order to pro-
mote civilization among the friendly Indian tribes, and to se-
cure the continuance of their friendship, it shall and may be
lawful for the President of the United States, to cause them to
be furnished with useful domestic animals, and implements of
husbandry, and also to furnish them with goods or money, in
such proportions, as he shall judge proper, and to appoint
such persons, from time to time, as temporary agents, to re-
side among the Indians, as he shall think proper: Provided,
That the whole amount of such presents, and allowance to
such agents, shall not exceed twenty thousand dollars per
annum.
Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That the superior
courts of each of the said territorial districts, and the circuit
courts, and other courts of the United States of similar juris-
diction in criminal causes in each district of the United
States, into which any offender against this act shall be first
brought, in which he shall be apprehended, shall have, and are
hereby invested with full power and authority, to hear and de-
termine all crimes, offences and misdemeanors against this
act; such courts proceeding therein, in the same manner, as if
such crimes, offences and misdemeanors had been committed
within the bounds of their respective district: And in all cases,
where the punishment shall not be death, the county courts of
quarter sessions in the said territorial districts, and the dis-
trict courts of the United States, in their respective districts,
shall have, and are hereby invested with like power to hear
and determine the same.
Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That it shall and may
be lawful for the President of the United States, and for the
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governors of such territorial districts, respectively, on proof to
them made, that any citizen or citizens of the United States,
or of the said districts, or either of them, have been guilty of
any of the said crimes, offences or misdemeanors, within any
town, settlement or territory, belonging to any nation or tribe
of Indians, to cause such person or persons to be appre-
hended, and brought into either of the United States, or of
the said districts, and to be proceeded against in due course of
law. And in all cases, where the punishment shall be death, it
shall be lawful for the governor of the district, into which the
offender may be first brought, or in which he may be appre-
hended, to issue a commission of oyer and terminer to the su-
perior judges of the district, who shall have full power and
authority to hear and determine all such capital cases, in the
same manner, as the superior courts of such districts have, in
their ordinary session: And when the offender shall be
brought into, or shall be apprehended in any of the United
States, except Kentucky, it shall be lawful for the President of
the United States, to issue a like commission to any two
judges of the supreme court of the United States, and the
judge of the district, in which the offender may have been ap-
prehended or first brought; which judges, or any two of them,
shall have the same jurisdiction in such capital cases, as the
circuit court of such district, and shall proceed to trial and
judgment, in the same manner, as such circuit court might or
could do.
Sec. 12. And be it further enacted, That all fines and for-
feitures, which shall accrue under this act, shall be, one half to
the use of the informant, and the other half, to the use of the
United States, except where the prosecution shall be first in-
stituted on behalf of the United States, in which case, the
whole shall be to their use.
Sec. 13. And be it further enacted, That nothing in this
act shall be construed to prevent any trade or intercourse with
Indians living on lands surrounded by settlements of the citi-
zens of the United States, and being within the jurisdiction of
any of the individual states.
Sec. 14. And be it further enacted, That all and every
other act and acts coming within the purview of this act, shall
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be and are hereby repealed.
Sec. 15. And be it further enacted, That this act shall be
in force, for the term of two years, and from thence to the end
of the then next session of Congress, and no longer.
Approved, March 1, 1793.
Ch. XIX, 1 Stat. 329 (1793).
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